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Abstract. In the context of value-based argumentation frameworks, and collective decisions, we are 
interested in the behavior of agents who are willing to misrep-resent their sincere beliefs about the ranking 
of values in order to ensure that their desired decision is agreed upon. We study the application of 
preference aggrega-tion mechanisms towards reaching a compromise ranking of values for a group of agents. 
Further, we study under which conditions agents can manipulate the out-come of the discussion. We 
investigate the computational complexity of this prob-lem.
1. Introduction
Argumentation is an inherently multi-agent phenomenon. It often occurs when agents
exchange information, aiming at reaching a collective view with respect to some issue.
However, it is not clear how to conceptualize the multi-agent character of argumentation.
One of the approaches towards solving this problem relies on the applications of aggre-
gation methods, associated with social choice theory. In such approaches, a compromise
structure of argumentation is provided for a number of agents, representing distinctive
views on it. Further, when mechanisms merging agents’ views about the aspects of ar-
gumentation are considered, agents might be willing to provide information conflicting
with their beliefs, to obtain a better outcome for themselves.
Intuitively, the goal of collectively solving argumentation problems is to select the
best arguments taking into account all relevant information that agents have at their dis-
posal and to fairly combine views on the structure of argumentation. Agents can have
preferences over accepted arguments, for instance if acceptance of some distinguished
arguments is determining the choice of some decision. Then, they might decide not to
submit arguments that they know about, as considered by Rahwan and Larson (2008).
Also, they can misrepresent their views on the strength of arguments to ameliorate the
outcome of discussion for themselves. We can also notice that arguments might appeal
to particular values, which are of diversified importance to a selector of arguments. It is
then plausible to assume that an attack on a strong argument from an argument of little
importance should not be taken into account.
Several approaches towards capturing the differences in the strength of arguments
have been introduced. One of them, value-based argumentation, was provided by Bench-
Capon (2003). In this framework it is assumed that arguments appeal to specific values,
which are of a distinctive importance to a particular agent. Then, an attack can be blocked
from her perspective if she ranks the value of the attacked argument higher than the value
of its attacker. This approach is suited to the problem of argumentation-based decision-
making, in which factors other than credibility of information are important while as-
sessing the acceptability of an argument. Also, it provides a clear justification for the
determined strength of arguments. This is important when an argumentation serves as a
support for decision-making; justification of strength of arguments contributes to the jus-
tification of a decision. It is worth noting that this constitutes a strong advantage of this
approach over assigning preferences over arguments directly, as in the preference-based
argumentation (e.g Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002). Bench-Capon’s approach makes sure that
agents only consider some arguments as stronger than another, if they have a good reason
to do so.
Recently, value-based argumentation has been studied in the multi-agent argumen-
tation setting. Airiau, Bonzon, Endriss, Maudet, and Rossit (2016) investigated the prob-
lem of rationalization of disagreements between agents with respect to the structure of
attacks between arguments. They propose to use value-based argumentation for this pur-
pose. In the current paper, we are considering a related problem of finding an argumen-
tation framework constituting a compromise between agents disagreeing about the struc-
ture of the attack relation because of their disagreement with respect to the importance
of values. Following Pu, Luo, Zhang, and Luo (2013) we consider aggregation of agents’
views on the importance of values with preference aggregation mechanisms. Then, we
study the possibility of manipulation in aggregating agents’ views on the strength of ar-
guments, determined by the importance of values they appeal to. We will consider argu-
mentation which results in a decision to either accept a certain action, or to reject it.
In Section 2 we present the basic framework in which the results are situated. We
introduce value-based argumentation, acceptability semantics, and we present the way to
employ it for group decision-making. Later, in Section 3, we study the ways of manipu-
lating aggregation in the context of value-based argumentation frameworks. For the sake
of simplicity our investigations are restricted to the grounded semantics. We finish with
conclusions and suggestions for future work.
2. Preliminaries
Dung (1995) introduces argumentation frameworks. Such frameworks consist of a set of
arguments and of a binary relation indicating which arguments are in conflict.
Definition 2.1 An argumentation framework (AF) is a pair AF = ⟨A,→⟩, where A is a set
of arguments and→⊆ A2 is the attack relation.
An argumentation framework is then a directed graph, which nodes are the argu-
ments, and edges represent the attacks between arguments.
A set of arguments S is said to defend an argument a if for any attacker of a there is
some member of S which attacks it.
Definition 2.2 Given an argumentation framework AF = ⟨A,→⟩, a set of arguments S ⊆A
and some argument a ∈ A, S defends a iff for any b ∈ A such that b→ a there is an a′ ∈ S
such that a′ → b. We say that S defends a set of arguments S′ ⊆ A iff S defends all a ∈ S′.
A function F ∶ 2A→ 2A assigns every S ⊆ A the set of all arguments that S defends. Also, 
S is said to be self-defended if S defends S.
The notion of defense is used to determine when a set of arguments can be rationally 
selected as an outcome of a discussion. In addition to this notion, the following criteria 
for selecting sets of arguments have been considered:
Definition 2 .3 Let AF = ⟨A,→⟩ be an argumentation framework, and S ⊆ A. S is:
• Conflict-free: iff there are no a,b ∈ S such that a→ b. We refer to the set of all
conflict-free sets of AF as CFRAF .
• Admissible: iff S is conflict-free and self-defended. We refer to the set of all ad-
missible sets of AF as ADMAF .
Based on these criteria, acceptability semantics define which sets of arguments (exten-
sions) can be collectively accepted (Dung, 1995).
Definition 2.4 Let AF = ⟨A,→⟩ be an argumentation framework, and S ⊆ A. S is:
• Complete: iff S is admissible and F(S) = S. We refer to the set of all complete
extensions of AF as CMPAF .
• Grounded: iff S is the minimal complete extension of AF w.r.t. set inclusion. We
refer to the grounded extension of AF as GRNDAF .
It can be noticed that the grounded extension is always unique. For simplicity, it is
this uniqueness that made us restrict the results of this paper to the grounded semantics.
An extension of the work to other, potentially multiple extension semantics, is left for
future work.
2.1. Value-Based Argumentation
In order to capture the specificity of argumentation about decisions, it is needed to take
into account the values to which arguments appeal (e.g Bench-Capon, 2003; Bench-
Capon, Doutre, & Dunne, 2007; Modgil, 2009). This approach is referred to as value-
based argumentation.
Value-based argumentation assumes that an audience of a discussion can establish
the relative strength of arguments on the basis of importance of values to which argu-
ments appeal. Consequently, an attack on an argument appealing to a higher value than its
attacker, can be disregarded by a relevant audience. As a result, some particular decision-
makers can be persuaded by a given argumentation to a different extent than others.
Value-based argumentation frameworks are an extension of the abstract argumenta-
tion frameworks. In addition to the set of arguments and a binary attack relation, a set of
values and a function mapping them to arguments are taken into account.
Definition 2.5 A value-based argumentation framework (VAF) is a tuple VAF= ⟨A,→ ,V,val⟩
where A is a set of arguments, →⊆ A2 is an attack relation, V is a set of values and
val ∶ A→V is a function assigning values to arguments.
The assignment of values to arguments provides a way of determining the strength of
arguments from the perspective of a particular audience. This is done by the specification
of an agent’s preferences over values.
Definition 2.6 Let VAF = ⟨A,→,V,val⟩. An audience P is a linear ordering over V . We
denote that a value v1 is strictly more preferable than a value v2 for P as v1 ≻P v2.
Then, we say that an argument defeats another, if it attacks it and the value it is assigned
is stronger or equal to the value of the attacked argument.
Definition 2.7 Let VAF = ⟨A,→,V,val⟩ be a VAF and P be an audience. Then, we say
that an argument a defeats an argument b for P (we denote it as a→P b) iff a→ b and it
is not the case that val(b) ≻P val(a).
Given this relation, we can consider a defeat graph, which is an argumentation frame-
work consisting of the set of arguments and of the defeat relation for some ordering P.
Definition 2.8 Let VAF = ⟨A,→,V,val⟩ and P be an audience. The defeat graph of VAF
based on P is an argumentation framework VAFP = ⟨A,→P⟩.
Let us illustrate the presented formalism on an example of a specific debate regard-
ing making a practical decision.
Example 2.1 (Airiau et al., 2016) Consider a debate regarding the possible ban of diesel
cars, aimed at the reduction of air pollution in big cities. The following arguments are
included in the discussion:
• A - Diesel cars should be banned.
• B - Artisans, who should be protected, cannot change their cars as it would be too
expensive for them.
• C - We can subsidize electric cars for artisans.
• D - Electric cars, which could be a substitute for diesel, require too many new
charging stations.
• E - We can build some charging stations.
• F - We cannot afford any additional costs.
• G - Health is more important than economy, so we should spend whatever is
needed for fighting pollution.
Further, it can be noticed that these arguments appeal to certain values. In partic-
ular, arguments A,G appeal to environmental responsibility (ER), B,C to social fairness
(SF), F to economic viability (EV) and D,E - to infrastructure efficiency (IE).
These arguments are represented on the graph with a mapping of values depicted
on Figure 1. For each argument, the first element of its description is its name, and the
second one is the name of the value it appeals to 1 .
A, ER
B, SF
D, IE
C, SF
E, IE
F, EVG, ER
Figure 1. Value-based argumentation framework VAF of Example 2.1
1Notice that the name of the values arguments appeal to is left in the nodes of the defeat graph, for clarity of
the representation, but that they are not part of the formal structure of the framework.
Let us now consider the structure of this discussion from the perspectives of two 
experts of a decision-making jury, that should decide on whether Diesel cars should be 
banned or not.
For Expert 1, economic viability is the most important. She ranks infrastructure 
efficiency lower, but higher than social fairness. Environmental responsibility is the least 
important for her. Then, from her point of view attacks in which the attacker appeals to a 
less important value than the attacked argument are disregarded. Taking her preferences 
into account, the structure presented in Figure 2 (a) is obtained, after the elimination of 
disregarded attacks. The grounded extension of this defeat graph is {F,B,D}.
A, ER
B, SF
D, IE
C, SF
E, IE
F, EVG, ER A, ER
B, SF
D, IE
C, SF
E, IE
F, EVG, ER
(a) Expert 1’s audience: EV ≻ IE ≻ SF ≻ ER (b) Expert 2’s audience: EV ≻ ER ≻ SF ≻ IE
Figure 2. Defeat graphs based on (a) Expert 1’s and (b) Expert 2’s audiences
Let us now consider another expert of the jury, who believes that economic viability
is the most important value. Expert 2 ranks environmental responsibility second, and so-
cial fairness third. Finally, she considers infrastructure efficiency as the least important.
From her perspective, the structure of successful attacks is much different, as indicated
in Figure 2 (b). The grounded extension of this defeat graph is {F,B,D,A}.
2.2. Decisive Argument
When aiming at reaching a decision, like in Example 2.1, an argument can be decisive,
in the sense that if it states that a decision should be taken, and if it is an acceptable
argument, then the decision should be taken.
This intuition can be captured by mapping information about a decisive support for
a decision to a considered argument.
Definition 2.9 Let AF = ⟨A,→⟩ be an argumentation framework. We call DP = ⟨AF,D⟩ a
decision problem w.r.t. an AF, where D ∈A is the decisive argument. Also, let VAF= ⟨A,→
,V,val⟩ be a value-based argumentation framework. We call DP = ⟨VAF,D⟩ a decision
problem w.r.t. a VAF, where D ∈ A is the decisive argument.
Example 2.2 (Continuation of Example 2.1) The decision of the experts of the jury relies
on whether the argument stating that the ban should be introduced, that is, on argument
A, is accepted or not. This decisive argument should be considered for the VAF, for the
defeat graphs of each of the experts, and for the collective defeat graph that will represent
their common view.
The notion of collective defeat graph will be defined in the next section.
3. Aggregation of Audiences in Value-Based Argumentation Frameworks
One of the intuitions behind the claim that the structure of argumentation can be viewed
in distinctive ways is that agents might not agree on whether particular arguments are
indeed in conflict with each other. Possible explanations for such a situation involve a
scenario in which particular agents disagree on the relative strength of arguments. As it
was argued earlier, it is plausible to assume that if an agent believes that some strong
argument is attacked by a weak one, she might decide to disregard this attack. However,
decisions about which arguments are stronger than another are at the discretion of in-
dividual assessors. Therefore, structures of successful attacks between arguments might
vary among the group of agents.
One of the methods of aggregating views on the relative strength of arguments is to
reach a collective view about the ordering over values that they appeal to. This approach
makes use of preference aggregation functions, pioneered by Arrow (1951), which con-
stitute one of major parts of social choice theory. In this way we might establish a col-
lective ordering over values and consequently compute a collective defeat graph of the
initial VAF. Then, evaluation of acceptance of a decisive argument can be performed.
This approach has been proposed earlier in the context of value-based argumentation by
Pu et al. (2013).
In order to provide the described procedure formally, preference aggregation func-
tions will be used. This mechanism, widely studied in social choice theory, considers a
profile of orderings over a set of items. Further, it provides a single, collective ordering.
Definition 3.1 (Preference Aggregation Function) Let V = {v1, . . . ,vn} be a set of op-
tions, N = {1, . . . ,m} be a set of agents, and P be the set of all linear orderings over V .
A profile of orderings (denoted as P) is an element of Pm. Then a preference aggregation
function is a function F ∶ Pm → P . We denote the set of agents supporting vi ≻ v j in a
profile of orderings P as Nvi≻v jP .
Then, given a VAF = ⟨A,→,V,val⟩ and a profile P of linear orderings over V , the
defeat graph AF = ⟨A,→Borda(P)⟩ can be considered as the collective defeat graph.
Definition 3.2 Take a VAF = ⟨A,→,V,val⟩, a profile P of preference orderings over V
and a preference aggregation function F. Then, a collective defeat graph for P under F
is the argumentation framework AF = ⟨A,→F(P)⟩.
An example of such a preference aggregation function is the Borda rule. This rule
is simple and easy to present which is why we use it for the illustration of the discussed
mechanisms. Naturally, a variety of different rules can be used. To describe the Borda
rule, let us also introduce a handy notation.
Notation 1 Let P be a linear order over some set V . We denote by top(P) the option
v ∈V such that for any v′ ≠ v, v ≻P v′. Further, we denote as rankP(v) the position of the
option v in the ordering P. Formally, rankP(v) = ∣{v′ ∈V ∣v′ ≻P v}∣+1.
To compute the result of the Borda rule, for any element Pi of a profile of linear
preference orderings P of length m over a set of options V , we assign to each option a
number of points. A score of an option v j given by an agent i, called BordaScorei(v j)
amounts to ∣V ∣ − rankPi(v j). Then, an overall score of v j, namely BordaScore(v j) =
Σni=1BordaScorei(v j). Finally Borda(P) is a preference ordering in which the rank of
each option is determined by the number of gained points. To obtain a linear ordering as 
the output of this function additional tie-breaking rules are needed.
Example 3.1 (Continuation of Example 2.2) Let us consider an additional expert, Ex-
pert 3. Let us present her audience, and let us recall the audiences of the other two 
experts. These three experts form a panel P.
• Expert 1: EV ≻ IE ≻ SF ≻ ER
• Expert 2: EV ≻ ER ≻ SF ≻ IE
• Expert 3: SF ≻ ER ≻ EV ≻ IE
The defeat graph based on Expert 3’s audience is depicted on Figure 3 (a).
A, ER
B, SF
D, IE
C, SF
E, IE
F, EVG, ER A, ER
B, SF
D, IE
C, SF
E, IE
F, EVG, ER
(a) Sincere audience SF ≻ ER ≻ EV ≻ IE (b) Insincere audience ER ≻ SF ≻ EV ≻ IE
Figure 3. Defeat graphs based on Expert 3’s audience
Let us now calculate the result of the Borda rule for P. The scores are: ER: 4, EV:
7, IE: 2, SF: 5. So, Borda(P)= EV ≻ SF ≻ ER ≻ IE. The defeat graph for this ordering is
presented in Figure 4 (a); this is the collective defeat graph for the panel.
A, ER
B, SF
D, IE
C, SF
E, IE
F, EVG, ER A, ER
B, SF
D, IE
C, SF
E, IE
F, EVG, ER
(a) Before any manipulation (b) After manipulation by Expert 3
Figure 4. Collective defeat graph for the panel P, under the Borda rule
3.1. Manipulation in Aggregating Audiences
In the current work we are interested in the behavior of agents who are willing to mis-
represent their sincere beliefs about the ranking of values in order to ensure that their
desired decision is agreed upon. Such a behavior is called manipulation. An important
assumption made for the sake of simplicity in the current work is that agents are aware
of orderings over values in which other agents believe. Relaxing this assumption would
be an interesting direction for further research.
To formalize this notion, let us define what agents’ preferences over outcomes of
aggregation are. In our setting agents are interested in ensuring that the collective prefer-
ence ordering induces a defeat graph in which the decisive argument that supports their
desired decision is accepted if and only if it is accepted in the defeat graph induced by
agents’ own ordering.
Following this intuition we say that given a decision problem and agents’ ordering
over values, an agent prefers some ordering to another if it treats the decisive argument
consistently with the agent’s intentions, while the other does not. Notice that these pref-
erences are dichotomous. Given a decision problem DP = ⟨VAF,D⟩ and a preference or-
dering Pi corresponding to some agent i, we say that i is in favor of D if it is in the
grounded extension of the defeat graph induced by Pi. If it is not, we say that i is against
D.
Definition 3.3 Let DP= ⟨VAF= ⟨A,→,V,val⟩,D⟩ be a decision problem and i be an agent
with a preference ordering Pi. If i is in favor of D, for any pair of preference orderings
P1,P2, P1 >i P2 iff D ∈GRND⟨A,→P1 ⟩ while D ∉GRND⟨A,→P2 ⟩. Also, if i is against D, P1 >i P2
iff D ∉GRND⟨A,→P1 ⟩ while D ∈GRND⟨A,→P2 ⟩.
Let us depict the problem of manipulation on an example.
Example 3.2 (Continuation of Example 3.1) Expert 1 is against the decision, since ar-
gument A is not in the grounded extension of the defeat graph based on her audience.
Expert 2 is in favor of the decision. Regarding Expert 3, the defeat graph based on her
audience (see Figure 3 (a)) has {G,C,E,A} as grounded extension: Expert 3 also is in
favor of the decision.
The decisive argument A is not in {F,B,D}, the grounded extension of the collective
defeat graph of Figure 4 (a).
Expert 3 may however decide to lie about her preference over values and submit an
ordering: ER ≻ SF ≻ EV ≻ IE. Now, the Borda scores would amount to: ER: 5, EV: 7, IE:
2, SF: 4. The modified result of the Borda rule is: EV ≻ ER ≻ SF ≻ IE. The corresponding
defeat graph is depicted on Figure 4 (b). The grounded extension of the defeat graph
based on this ordering is {F,B,D,A}; the decisive argument belongs to this extension.
So, by misrepresenting her sincere beliefs, Expert 3 can ensure that the argument she
is in favor of, is accepted in the collective defeat graph. Expert 3 can thus manipulate.
A preference aggregation rule is said to be strategy-proof, when it is never possible
for a single agent to manipulate.
Definition 3.4 (Strategy-proofness with respect to argumentation) A preference ag-
gregation rule F is strategy-proof with respect to argumentation iff for any profile of pref-
erence orderings P any agent i and any preference ordering P∗i , it is not the case that
F(P∗i ,P−Pi) >i F(P), where (P∗i ,P−Pi) is the profile of orderings identical to P except of
the replacement of Pi with P∗i .
Let us also phrase manipulation as a computational problem.
VAF-MANIPULATION(F)
Instance: DP = ⟨VAF,D⟩, a profile of preference orderings P, agent i.
Question: Is there a preference ordering P∗i such that F(P∗i ,P−Pi) >i F(P)?
VV
The results concerning manipulation in the argumentation setting will be based on 
the facts about manipulation in voting mechanisms. They will be introduced in the sub-
sequent section.
3.2. Voting Mechanisms
Aggregating preference orderings is strictly connected with engineering voting rules. 
There, a group of voters elects an option out of a set of candidates. Mechanisms of 
this kind aim at ensuring that the winner of the elections represents agents’ preferences 
accurately. Technically, a voting rule is a function F ∶ Pm →O, where P is the set of all 
preference orderings over the set of options O and m is the number of voters. Notice that 
we have imposed that a rule always selects a single option. This property is known as the 
resoluteness condition.
Voting rules can be envisaged as preference aggregation rules. Then, the winner of 
elections is the top option of the collective preference ordering.
If this is the case, preferences of particular voters can be clearly defined. Each of 
them wants to make sure that the winner of the election is as good as possible from the 
perspective of their ranking.
Definition 3.5 (Strategic Voting P references) Let an agent i  submit some ordering Pi 
over some set of options V . Then, for any pair of preference orderings P1,P2 over V , 
P1 >i P2 iff rankPi (top(P1)) > rankPi (top(P2)).
Then, we can ask if an agent can make herself better off with respect to strategic voting 
preferences by submitting an insincere preference ordering. If for some function F it is 
never the case, we say that F is strategy-proof with respect to voting preferences.
Definition 3.6 (Strategy-proofness in v oting) A preference aggregation rule F is strategy-
proof in voting iff for any profile of preference orderings P, any agent i and any prefer-
ence ordering Pi
∗, it is not the case that F(Pi∗,P−Pi ) >i F(P).
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) states that 
any rule which is strategy-proof with respect to voting preferences is also dictatorial 
with respect to strategic voting. Here, a rule is said to be dictatorial if there is an agent 
whose most preferred option is always selected. Conditions of the theorem involve non-
imposition, which means that any option is elected by some preference ordering. Also, 
the conditions include resoluteness.
Theorem 1 (Gibbard - Satterthwaite) Any resolute, nonimposed, and strategy-proof 
voting rule for three or more alternatives must be a dictatorship.
For instance, Borda rule cannot be strategy-proof as it is not a dictatorship.
3.3. Application of Strategic Voting
We will show that if it is possible for an agent to manipulate a preference aggregation 
rule with respect to voting, she might also manipulate with respect to argumentation.
Proposition 1 Any preference aggregation rule F which is manipulable with respect to 
voting preferences is also manipulable with respect to argumentation.
PROOF. Consider any preference aggregation rule F which is manipulable with re-
spect to strategic voting. This means that there is a set of voters N = {1, . . . ,n}, a set
of options V = {v1, . . . ,vm} and a profile of preference orderings submitted by voters
P = ⟨P1, . . . ,Pn⟩ such that for some voter i, there is some preference ordering P∗i over V
such that ranki(top(F(P))) < ranki(top(F(P∗))), where P∗ is P with Pi replaced by
P∗i . Take such a profile. We will construct a decision problem DP = ⟨VAF,C⟩ which is
manipulable by the successful manipulator with respect to strategic voter.
Let us take a set of values V and the set of arguments A = {a1, . . . ,am} (one per
element of V ). Further, take the valuation map val such that for any ai ∈ A, val(i) = vi.
For simplicity let us say that Pi = v1 ≻i v2 ≻i ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≻i vm. Now, let a1 be the decisive argument.
Then, let v j correspond to top(F(P)). Construct the attack relation so that a j → a1. Also,
for any vb such that ranki(vb) > ranki( j), let ab→ a j. No other attacks are considered.
Then firstly notice that for the agent i the argument a1 should be accepted, as it is in
the grounded extension of the defeat graph based on i’s preference ordering. However,
it is not included in the grounded extension of the defeat graph based on F(P), as all
attacks on a j are eliminated because v j is the top value. However, we know that i can
submit an ordering P∗ such that some vb ≻i v j becomes the top option. Then, clearly
one of the attackers of v j, which is the only attacker of the decisive argument is the top
option, so the attack is preserved. Therefore, vi is accepted in the new defeat graph. So i
manipulated successfully. ∎
This result is followed by an unfortunate conclusion. Namely, it turns out that for
any preference aggregation rule F based on strict preferences, if F is not dictatorial with
respect to strategic voting, it is manipulable in the current setting.
To justify this claim it is sufficient to take any preference aggregation rule F based
on strict preferences and suppose that it is not dictatorial with respect to strategic voting.
Then, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem we know that it is manipulable with respect
to strategic voting. But then it follows that it is also manipulable in the argumentation
setting.
This means that aggregating VAFs by preference aggregation is at least as vulnerable
to strategic behavior as voting mechanisms. In fact, we can find cases in which rules
strategy-proof with respect to strategic voting are manipulable within the argumentation
setting.
Observation 1 It is not true that if a rule F is strategy-proof in voting, it is strategy-proof
with respect to argumentation.
Example 3.3 Consider the following preference aggregation rule F: For any profile of
preference orderings P distinguish a dictator d. Then, top(F(P)) = top(Pd). To deter-
mine the rest of the collective preference ordering, eliminate the value top(Pd) from the
profile of orderings. Apply the Borda rule to the remainder of the profile. This rule is
strategy-proof with respect to strategic voting, as the top option is known from the start.
Now consider the following decision problem DP, where argument 3 is the decisive
argument:
3, v3 4, v42, v21, v1
Now take a profile P, where agent d is the dictator:
d ∶ v2 ≻ v1 ≻ v4 ≻ v3, m ∶ v3 ≻ v4 ≻ v1 ≻ v2, o ∶ v4 ≻ v3 ≻ v2 ≻ v1
Let us now notice that the score of v1 is 3, v3 receives 5 points, and v4 gets 6 . The
score of v2 does not matter as it is dictator’s top option. So, we get F(P) = v2 ≻ v4 ≻ v3 ≻
v1. It is easy to see that under this ordering argument 3 is not in the grounded extension,
as the attack 4→ 3 is preserved, while 3→ 4 is not. This leaves agent m dissatisfied, as
in the defeat graph based on her preferences argument 3 is clearly accepted.
Consider, however, the profile:
d ∶ v2 ≻ v1 ≻ v4 ≻ v3, m∗ ∶ v3 ≻ v2 ≻ v1 ≻ v4, o ∶ v4 ≻ v3 ≻ v2 ≻ v1
After this change the score of v1 is 3, v3 receives 5 points, and v4 gets 6. Therefore,
the collective preference ordering is v2 ≻ v4 ≻ v3 ≻ v1. Under this ordering 3 is accepted
in the collective structure. So, m manipulated successfully.
This means that the current setting is strictly less immune to strategic behavior than
strategic voting. However, we can show that for a large class of rules, the manipulation
problem is difficult to compute. Thanks to this observation we can claim that the pro-
posed mechanism can eliminate manipulation in practical applications. As we will show,
if a rule is NP-hard with respect to the problem of strategic voting, it is also NP-hard
with respect to our setting.
Proposition 2 For any preference aggregation rule F for which the strategic voting prob-
lem is NP-hard, so is the VAF-manipulation problem with respect to F.
PROOF. Take any preference aggregation rule F for which the strategic voting problem
is NP-hard. Let us show the way to reduce this problem to manipulation in the current
setting. Take a profile of preference orderings P and an agent i with a preference or-
dering Pi. Let us construct a decision problem in which i can manipulate if and only if
she can manipulate with respect to strategic voting. Take a VAF in which we have an
argument corresponding to any ranked option. Also, map each of the options as val-
ues of corresponding arguments. Further, let i’s favourite option correspond to the de-
cisive argument - ai. Now, let the argument a j, corresponding to top(F(P)) attack ai
iff ai ≠ a j. Also, let any argument ab such that val(ab) ≻Pi val(ai) attack a j. Clearly,
i is in favor of ai. We need to show that i can manipulate with respect to argumen-
tation setting iff she can manipulate with respect to strategic voting. If i can manipu-
late with respect to argumentation setting, then there is a preference ordering P∗i such
that ranki(top(F(P∗i ,P−Pi))) > ranki(top(F(P))). Otherwise, ai would not be in the
grounded extension of the defeat graph induced by F(P∗i ,P−Pi). But then, i can manip-
ulate with respect to strategic voting. But also, if there is a preference ordering P∗i such
that ranki(top(F(P∗i ,P−Pi))) > ranki(top(FP)), then D becomes in the grounded exten-
sion of the defeat graph induced by F(P∗i ,P−Pi). So, i can manipulate with respect to
VAF-manipulation. ∎
4. Conclusions
In this work we studied applications of social choice mechanisms to aggregating views
on preferences over values. Following Pu et al. (2013), we used preference aggregation
functions to determine a collective preference ordering over values. Further, we have
studied strategic behavior within the proposed models for collective decision-making.
We used results concerning strategic voting to establish conditions for manipulability in
preference aggregation. Following this connection we also obtained results concerning
the complexity of manipulation problem in the preference aggregation approach.
We have shown that strictly more rules are manipulable with respect to the studied
decision-making setting than with respect to strategic voting. This means, that any rule
strategy-proof with respect to aggregating audiences in VAFs is dictatorial with respect
to strategic voting. It is worth noting that this is not necessarily a very problematic result.
A strategy-proof preference aggregation function which is only dictatorial with respect
to one value can still be fair with respect to a large part of the preference ordering.
Our study leaves room for further work. It would be interesting to study the complex-
ity of manipulating preference aggregation by submitting a preference ordering which is
minimally different from the agents’ sincere hierarchy of values. Also, it would be ben-
eficial to investigate the complexity of manipulation for semantics other than grounded.
Another interesting avenue of research would be to investigate structural properties of
VAFs eliminating the possibility of strategic behavior.
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